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I. INTRODUCTION 
Testators who make every effort to preserve their assets, consult with 
an attorney, and strategize their dispositions may still face the scorn of a 
friend or relative who feels slighted by an unfavorable bequest.  While 
theoretically a testator may be of sound mind and free from undue influence 
up until his last moments, it is not until after death that potential takers will 
emerge to challenge the validity of his will.1  The best advocate to defend 
these challenges—the testator—is no longer available to offer evidence to 
the contrary, and courts must instead rely upon the often self-interested 
hearsay that remains.2  Executors and estate planners alike have long been 
cognizant of this “worst evidence” rule,3 as well as the headache of litigation 
it often creates. 
But testators are not without recourse; options exist to mitigate the 
potential litany of challenges arising after death.  Of these options, the ability 
to seek a pre-death judgment validating one’s will as to formalities, 
testamentary capacity, and freedom from undue influence has been hotly 
debated.4  Ante-mortem probate, as it is more commonly known, enables 
living testators to seek judicial validation of their wills to reduce the 
likelihood of a will contest.5 
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 1  John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2044 (1994). 
 2  See id. 
 3  See id. 
 4  See generally Jacob Arthur Bradley, Antemortem Probate Is a Bad Idea: Why 
Antemortem Probate Will Not Work and Should Not Work, 85 MISS. L.J. 1431 (2017); Mary 
Louise Fellows, The Case Against Living Probate, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1066 (1980); John H. 
Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1978); Taren 
R. Lord-Halvorson, Why Wait Until We Die? Living Probate in a New Light, 37 OKLA. CITY 
U. L. REV. 543 (2012). 
 5  Glenn R. Kazlow et al., Ante-Mortem Probate: Why Wait Until It’s Too Late?, 214 
N.J. L.J. 1051 (2013). 
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Candidly, the benefits of ante-mortem probate are undeniable; a judicial 
declaration of validity shields a testator’s bequests from future undue 
influence and capacity challenges, arming the testator with a weapon to 
defend the legitimacy of his wishes.  Furthermore, ante-mortem probate is 
entirely consistent with the societal value of freedom of disposition, the 
principle that individuals are free to control the disposition of their property 
during life and at death.6  Ante-mortem probate enhances this principle by 
providing a definitive mechanism through which testators can ensure proper 
succession of their legacies. 
Despite its advantages, the broad shortcomings of ante-mortem probate, 
such as potential family disharmony and strain on judicial resources, are 
obvious impediments to its widespread adoption.7  Much like the standard 
probate process, a lifetime probate proceeding is generally public in nature, 
with the added presence of the testator to defend all challenges.8  This 
particular aspect has the potential to create significant discord among family 
members; the testator is forced to suffer the displeasure of relatives angered 
by unfavorable bequests or omissions.9  Additionally, because testators may 
amend or revoke a will at any time,10 the potential exists for a flood of 
petitions on probate courts, resulting in excessive strain on the judicial 
system. 
While volumes of academic material exist to support state codification 
in theory, implementation of a viable ante-mortem probate model remains 
largely unexplored in practice; only a handful of states offer a mechanism 
for pre-death will validation.11  Though most jurisdictions have yet to 
consider the proposition, the push for ante-mortem probate in New Jersey is 
gaining notable traction.  After the concept was revisited in an article by 
Glenn R. Kazlow,12 the New Jersey State Law Revision Commission 
authorized a survey-type project to evaluate the effects of ante-mortem 
probate in New Jersey.13  Specifically, the project sought feedback from local 
scholars and practitioners to gain a better understanding of the effects of pre-
 
 6  See Gerry W. Beyer, Will Contests—Prediction and Prevention, 4 EST. PLAN. & 
COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 1, 51 (2011); Lee-ford Tritt, Technical Correction or Tectonic Shift: 
Competing Default Rule Theories Under the New Uniform Probate Code, 61 ALA. L. REV. 
273, 280 (2010). 
 7  See infra Part III. 
 8  See infra Part II.A. 
 9  See Fellows supra note 4, at 1075. 
 10  See infra Part II. 
 11  See infra Part II.B. 
 12  See Kazlow et al., supra note 5, at 1051. 
 13  Katherine M. Arango, Trial and Heirs: Antemortem Probate for the Changing 
American Family, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 779, 795 (2016). 
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death will validation.14 
Responding to this inquiry, Susan G. Thatch, staff member of Counsel 
for the New Jersey Law Revision Commission, published an in-depth 
comment analyzing the major critiques and benefits of ante-mortem probate 
in its current form.15  Thatch found ante-mortem probate to be a “valuable 
estate-planning tool” and concluded that “any legislation that New Jersey 
may decide to promulgate should be designed . . . to supplement New 
Jersey’s current traditional form of probate and to provide individuals and 
their legal advisors with another tool . . . to ensure that final wishes are 
carried out after death.”16 
Thatch’s comment effectively highlights the main concerns of adopting 
ante-mortem legislation but leaves open for suggestion the possibility of a 
workable model for New Jersey to consider.  As such, Part II of this 
Comment will begin by briefly addressing the evolution of ante-mortem 
probate, as well as the minority of states that promulgate it.  Part III will then 
focus on the legal and practical considerations of adopting current models, 
expanding on the points offered by Thatch, as well as presenting additional 
areas of concern.17  Finally, Part IV will suggest a viable model of ante-
mortem probate, specifically tailored to the State of New Jersey.  Part V will 
briefly conclude. 
II. CURRENT MODELS AND APPLICATIONS OF ANTE-MORTEM PROBATE 
Over the last several decades, three models have persisted to guide 
states in adopting ante-mortem schemes.  Each model essentially builds off 
the prior one, while maintaining significant differences in application. 
A. Primary Models of Ante-Mortem Probate 
1. The Contest Model 
The Contest Model can most aptly be characterized as identical to the 
process of post-mortem probate, except for the timing in which it occurs.18  
First proposed by Professor Howard Fink in 1976, the Contest Model shifts 
the timing of a probate proceeding to occur while the testator is “alive and 
 
 14  Id. 
 15  Susan G. Thatch, Esq., Ante-Mortem Probate in New Jersey—An Idea Resurrected?, 
39 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 331 (2015). 
 16  Id. at 353–54. 
 17  For a brief summation of Thatch’s comment, see Gerry W. Beyer, Add Probating Your 
Will to Your Bucket List, JOTWELL (May 25, 2016), https://trustest.jotwell.com/2016/05/ 
(reviewing Susan G. Thatch, Ante-Mortem Probate in New Jersey—An Idea Resurrected?, 39 
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 331 (2015)). 
 18  See Fellows, supra note 4, at 1073. 
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able to testify . . . in direct view of the court or jury.”19 
Under the Contest Model, an adversarial proceeding is initiated to 
obtain a declaratory judgment as to the testator’s capacity, compliance with 
execution formalities, and the presence of any undue influence.20  Parties to 
the proceeding include beneficiaries under the will and those who would take 
by intestate succession, although states that have adopted this model also 
include beneficiaries of prior wills that are affected by the proceeding.21  
Findings of validity are binding upon all parties to, or represented in, the 
action.22  Once the will is declared valid, it is subsequently placed on file 
with the court.23  Amendments to the will can be validated through another 
proceeding of the same nature.24  Finally, to prevent the risk of an 
unfavorable verdict in future actions, facts found in a proceeding are 
inadmissible as evidence in actions other than for determinations of a will’s 
validity.25 
2. The Conservatorship Model 
The Conservatorship Model was proposed by Professor John H. 
Langbein in 1978, and served mainly to address concerns of family 
disharmony created by the Contest Model’s non-confidential nature.26  The 
Conservatorship Model attempts to strike more of a balance between the 
interests of the testator and presumptive takers by improving the defensive 
opportunities for potential challengers.27  Similar to Fink’s proposal under 
the Contest Model, Langbein’s Conservatorship Model requires the testator 
to institute a proceeding by submitting a petition to the court with the 
proffered will attached.28  As a result, the will itself is publicly disclosed.29 
Throughout the petition process, Langbein stresses the testator’s 
obligation to be represented by counsel, not only for the purpose of ensuring 
accurate preparation, but also to safeguard against potentially frivolous use 
of the system.30  Notice requirements under the Conservatorship Model are 
also similar to the Contest Model in that the testator must give notice of the 
 
 19  Howard D. Fink, Ante-Mortem Probate Revisited: Can an Idea Have a Life After 
Death?, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 264, 266 (1976).  
 20  Id. at 275. 
 21  Fellows, supra note 4, at 1073 n.27. 
 22  See Fink, supra note 19, at 276. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. 
 25  Id. at 277. 
 26  See Langbein, supra note 4. 
 27  Id. at 78. 
 28  Id. at 77. 
 29  Id. 
 30  Id. at 78. 
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proceedings to the beneficiaries named in the will, those that would take 
under intestate succession, and beneficiaries from prior wills.31 
The most drastic departure from the Contest Model is undoubtedly 
Langbein’s proposal of a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of any 
and all beneficiaries who may be affected by a mistaken ruling.32  
Specifically, the guardian ad litem is granted powers of discovery under the 
supervision of the court.33  These powers include the ability to conduct 
depositions or request documents that may be relevant to the court’s 
determination of capacity or undue influence.34 
The cost of the guardian ad litem is imposed upon the testator, so as to 
discourage the testator’s abuse of the system and to alleviate presumptive 
takers of the need to calculate whether bringing a challenge is worth the 
cost.35  The argument may be made that such an imposition unfairly shifts 
costs normally borne by contestants to the testator, depleting the future estate 
as a result.  Langbein contends, however, that “to permit the testator to inflict 
upon his heirs apparent the choice between defaulting or bearing [the 
accelerated costs of ante-mortem probate]” is a serious mistake of legislative 
policy.36  Rather, Langbein insists that justice requires testators to bear the 
cost of litigation, as ante-mortem probate is at the “testator’s option, 
provided for the testator’s benefit.”37 
Langbein additionally notes that the requirement of a guardian ad litem 
would allow interested parties to bring challenges anonymously, thereby 
preventing any threat of family disharmony caused by a challenge.38  A lack 
of anonymity might cause the testator to reduce or eliminate a challenger’s 
inheritance as a form of punishment, inflicting great strain on the familial 
relationship between the testator and challenger in the process.39  Thus, 
Langbein asserts that the ability to anonymously contest the will through a 
guardian ad litem allows evidence of incapacity or undue influence to be 
introduced without the threat of testator retaliation.40 
 
 
 
 
 31  See id. 
 32  Langbein, supra note 4, at 78. 
 33  Id. at 79. 
 34  Id. 
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. at 75. 
 37  Id. 
 38  Langbein, supra note 4, at 79.  
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. 
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Some scholars argue that this alteration of the Contest Model is 
inadequate to prevent family disharmony.41  Specifically, testators and other 
parties are likely to recognize the source of a challenge.42  For example, if 
the guardian ad litem submits evidence of a personal nature that only a 
spouse would know, the testator might realize that the challenge came from 
a spouse.  Under the same example, even if such evidence did not originate 
from a spouse, the testator might nevertheless assume that it did, incidentally 
straining the spousal relationship in the process. 
As a final matter, the Conservatorship Model does away with the option 
of a jury for functional reasons of judicial experience and evidentiary 
standards.43  Langbein notes that the format of an ante-mortem probate 
proceeding differs drastically from post-mortem probate in the nature of 
proofs.44  In a standard probate proceeding, evidence concerning the testator 
is often scattered and incomplete; this makes a jury instrumental in the fact-
finding process.45  Alternatively, Langbein opines that the evidence in an 
ante-mortem proceeding is readily available and thus better left to a judge 
experienced in gerontology.46 
3. The Administrative Model 
The third most widely acknowledged model of ante-mortem probate 
was introduced in 1979 by Professors Gregory S. Alexander and Albert M. 
Pearson.47  The Administrative Model, as it was called, primarily served to 
critique the confidentiality and disclosure requirements of the 
Conservatorship Model.48  The Administrative Model adopts the guardian ad 
litem suggested by Langbein, but operates through a purely administrative 
(rather than judicial) ex parte proceeding.49 
Upon petition to the court, a guardian ad litem is appointed to examine 
the testator’s capacity, not as a representative of presumptive takers but 
instead as an investigator for the court.50  The guardian ad litem “conducts 
 
 41  Fellows, supra note 4, at 1075. 
 42  Id. 
 43  Langbein, supra note 4, at 80. 
 44  Id.  
 45  Id. 
 46  Id. at 80–81.  On this point, Langbein seems to infer that older individuals are the more 
likely candidates for engaging in the process of ante-mortem probate.  No substantial evidence 
exists, however, to affirm or deny this inference.  Younger individuals are equally as free to 
seek pre-death will validation, as evidenced by the lack of any age restrictions in current ante-
mortem jurisdictions.  See infra Part II.B. 
 47  Gregory S. Alexander & Albert M. Pearson, Alternative Methods of Ante-Mortem 
Probate and Procedural Due Process Limitations on Succession, 78 MICH. L. REV. 89 (1979). 
 48  Id. at 90. 
 49  Id. at 112. 
 50  Id. at 113–14. 
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private interviews, evaluates the capacity of the testator, and informs the 
court of the information discovered.”51  The will itself is reviewed by the 
court in camera, and remains confidential throughout the entire proceeding.52 
Additionally, the Administrative Model promulgates the belief that 
prospective heirs have no constitutional right to notice; their potential 
interests in the estate are “weak” because the testator may alter a bequest at 
any point during his or her lifetime.53  Thus, Alexander and Pearson contend 
that the consequences stemming from a public will and expansive notice 
requirements under the Contest and Conservatorship models are effectively 
eliminated.54 
As a disadvantage, even the Administrative Model is argued to place 
strain on family harmony.  Specifically, scholars have argued that when the 
court requires the guardian ad litem to investigate potential concerns, 
suspicions among family members can arise.55 
B. Jurisdictions Offering Ante-mortem Probate 
As it stands, only a handful of states currently authorize ante-mortem 
probate, while others have attempted to adopt legislation with limited 
success.56  Each jurisdiction primarily draws from the adversarial approach 
of Fink’s Contest Model, though several unique deviations exist with respect 
to certain procedural applications. 
1. The Petition Process: Who Can File 
In each of the ante-mortem jurisdictions, a petition or complaint for 
declaratory judgment must be submitted to the court with the proffered will 
attached.57  To commence the proceeding, a majority of ante-mortem states, 
including Delaware and Ohio, require that testators be domiciled or own real 
property within the state.58 
 
 
 
 51  Id.  
 52  Id.  
 53  See Aloysius A. Leopold & Gerry W. Beyer, Ante-Mortem Probate: A Viable 
Alternative, 43 ARK. L. REV. 131, 169 (1990); Alexander & Pearson, supra note 47, at 115. 
 54  Alexander & Pearson, supra note 47, at 90. 
 55  Fellows, supra note 4, at 1077. 
 56  North Dakota, Ohio, Arkansas, Alaska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and 
Delaware each maintain their own ante-mortem probate statutes.  See infra Part II(B).  Nevada 
unsuccessfully proposed ante-mortem legislation in 2011, but currently offers a limited form 
of ante-mortem probate through an amendment to its declaratory judgment statute.  Id. 
 57  See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-01 to -04 (Westlaw through 2017 Legis. Sess.). 
 58  ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-202 (West 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1311(a) (2015); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 552:18(II) (2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.081 (West 1979). 
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Alaska expands these eligibility requirements to include will-appointed 
representatives or any interested party to whom the testator gives consent, 
regardless of whether the testator is domiciled in Alaska.59  Along with the 
petition, Alaska requires the addition of statements signed by the petitioner 
affirming the contemporariness of the will, its compliance with execution 
formalities, and a general statement that the testator is familiar with its 
contents.60 
2. Parties to the Proceeding 
The petition or complaint must name and be served upon specific 
parties to the will.  The majority of ante-mortem jurisdictions require service 
upon beneficiaries named in the will, as well as any party eligible to take 
under state intestacy laws had the testator died on the date of filing.61 
New Hampshire and Delaware offer the most comprehensive notice 
requirements of the ante-mortem jurisdictions.  A petition filed in New 
Hampshire must name any “interested party,” including the petitioner’s 
spouse, heirs, devisees under the will, appointed executors, and the director 
of any charitable trust that is a devisee.62  An “interested party” may also be 
any other person who, if the petitioner had died on the date of filing, would 
be deemed an interested party in a judicial proceeding to prove the will.63 
Delaware’s notice requirements drastically depart from the other six 
jurisdictions.  The scope of notice is broadened to include any party affected 
by a power of appointment in the will, as well as “any other person the 
testator wishes to be bound” by a ruling of validity.64  Most significantly, 
Delaware provides a “notice statute” whereby interested parties are given 
time sensitive notices to bring challenges of their own volition.65  This 
directly contrasts with the other ante-mortem jurisdictions, which provide 
“filing statutes” that require the testator to petition the court and initiate the 
action whether or not there is an actual challenge.66 
 
 59  ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.12.530 (West 2010); § 13.12.540(a). 
 60  § 13.12.545. 
 61  ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-201 (West 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 552:18(III) 
(Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess., Ch. 4); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-08.1-02 (Westlaw 
through 2017 Legis. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.081(A) (West 2012). 
 62  § 552:18(III). 
 63  Id.  While the statute does not provide specific examples of what “other” parties may 
be deemed interested persons, it is likely that this is meant as a catch-all granting the court 
discretion for unanticipated circumstances. 
 64  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1311(b) –(c) (2015). 
 65  Id. 
 66  See Ralph Lehman et al., Determining the Validity of Wills and Trusts–Before Death, 
6 OHIO PROB. L.J. 7 (2011). 
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3. Rulings on Construction 
In a 2009 amendment to its declaratory judgment statute, Nevada 
adopted a highly simplistic form of ante-mortem probate.67  The statute’s 
overall comprehensiveness pales in comparison to other jurisdictions; it 
narrowly enables testators to obtain a declaratory judgment as to questions 
of will validity.68  One unique aspect of this statute, however, is that it also 
allows testators to resolve questions of will construction, an issue which 
none of the other ante-mortem jurisdictions explicitly address.69  The testator 
need not be incompetent to obtain such a ruling, and may do so at any point 
before his death.70 
4. Binding Effect of a Ruling: Revocation and Modification 
If a court deems the will valid as to formalities, testamentary capacity, 
and freedom from undue influence, it will issue a binding declaration of 
validity and place the will on file.71  The binding effect of the declaration 
tends to vary among states, especially where a testator subsequently modifies 
or revokes his will. 
Jurisdictions such as Ohio and Alaska direct that the binding effect of 
a declaration of validity remains effective unless and until the testator 
modifies or revokes his will.72  A testator is free to revoke or amend his will 
through any lawful process, but will not retain the binding declaration of 
validity without going through the process again.73  Delaware mirrors the 
language of these states but further provides that the binding nature of a 
proceeding will not abrogate the right of a spouse to file for an elective share, 
or restrict the period during which an intestate heir may claim any intestate 
portion of the testator’s estate.74 
By comparison, New Hampshire’s statute contains a subtle, but 
noteworthy difference: upon a testator’s death, a declaration of validity will 
remain binding to the extent that the testator has not modified or revoked the 
will after the proceeding.75  In this regard, New Hampshire seemingly offers 
the most testator-friendly provision as to the binding effect of a declaration; 
a court will uphold any portion of the validated will that remains after the 
 
 67  See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.040 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 137.007 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
 68  Id. 
 69  § 30.040. 
 70  See id. 
 71  See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.084 (West 1979). 
 72  Id.; ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.12.555 (West 2010). 
 73  § 13.12.555. 
 74  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1311 (2015).  
 75  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 552:18(VII) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess., Ch. 4). 
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testator’s death.76 
In North Dakota, a declaration of validity is permanent unless the 
testator petitions the court to modify or revoke his will.77  In such cases, the 
declaration’s binding effect will cease until the testator executes a new will 
and institutes another ante-mortem proceeding naming not only the parties 
to the new proceeding, but any parties to former proceedings as well.78 
Alternatively, Arkansas permits testators to modify or supersede a 
validated will “by subsequently executed valid wills, codicils, and other 
testamentary instruments, whether or not validated under a subsequent 
proceeding.79  This directly contrasts with North Dakota’s requirement that 
a new validation proceeding occur to revoke or modify a submitted will.80 
5. Protective Measures 
At least four jurisdictions have recognized the potential for challengers 
to attack the validity of a will by citing a testator’s failure to utilize ante-
mortem probate during his lifetime.81  To counter this threat, these 
jurisdictions expressly provide that a testator’s failure to commence an ante-
mortem proceeding during his lifetime cannot be used by future challengers 
as evidence of lack of capacity or undue influence.82 
As a final point, the public nature of an ante-mortem proceeding is 
arguably one of its most significant disadvantages.  Not only is the will 
prematurely exposed to the testator’s heirs and devisees, but it is fully 
available to the prying eyes of the public.83  Alaska is the only ante-mortem 
jurisdiction that implements a comprehensive approach with respect to the 
confidentiality of a proceeding.  Specifically, only a notice of filing, 
summary of formal proceedings, and dispositional order are made available 
to the public.84  All other information related to the petition process is kept 
confidential, and is only accessible by: (1) the petitioner and his or her 
attorney; (2) interested parties that have appeared in the proceedings or have 
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court; (3) the judge who took part in the 
proceeding; (4) court staff for essential authorized purposes; or (5) any other 
 
 76  Id.  
 77  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-08.1-03 (Westlaw through 2017 Legis. Sess.). 
 78  Id. 
 79  ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-203 (West 1979) (emphasis added). 
 80  Id.  Compare id., with § 30.1-08.1-03. 
 81  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1311(d) (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 552:18 (IX) 
(Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess., Ch. 4); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-08.1-04 (Westlaw 
through 2017 Legis. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.081(B) (West 2012). 
 82  Id. 
 83  See Langbein, supra note 4, at 77. 
 84  ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.12.585 (West 2010). 
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person for good cause shown.85 
III. LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF ANTE-MORTEM 
PROBATE IN NEW JERSEY 
It is undeniable that ante-mortem probate has its benefits, especially 
when considering the flexibility it provides to honor a testator’s freedom of 
disposition.  The freedom of disposition is a fundamental principal of 
donative transfer in American law, and endows testators with the “nearly 
unrestricted right to dispose of their property as they please.”86  Ante-mortem 
probate enhances this freedom by providing testators with additional 
opportunities to ensure disposition is effected in accordance with their 
wishes.  If New Jersey is to join the current minority of states, however, 
certain legal and practical considerations must be recognized. 
A. Legal Considerations 
1. Standing of Interested Parties 
A primary consideration of ante-mortem probate is an interested party’s 
ability to establish standing.  It has long been held in New Jersey that a 
testator’s heirs and devisees are not identifiable until the testator’s death.87  
Moreover, “no one may [challenge a will] unless she would be injured by the 
probate of the will propounded.”88  Because an heir or devisee’s interest 
during the testator’s lifetime is a mere expectancy or possibility,89 there can 
be no certainty of injury until the will is admitted to probate.  So long as the 
testator is alive and able to modify or revoke the current will, any person’s 
interest is a mere expectancy and thus cannot be certain.90  This ambiguity is 
only further compounded by various familial changes likely to occur in a 
testator’s life.  A marriage, divorce, birth or adoption of a child, or even the 
death of a close relative, all have the potential to affect the expectancy 
interests of heirs-apparent. 
 
 85  Id.   
 86  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2003). 
 87  In re Buzby’s Estate, 118 A. 835, 836 (N.J. 1922) (“The legal relation, or status, of 
heirs at law and next of kin arises immediately upon the death of the ancestor . . . .”). 
 88  In re Myers’ Will, 119 A.2d 129, 133 (N.J. 1955). 
 89  In re Will of Gardner, 522 A.2d 492, 496 n.5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (noting 
a devisee’s interest is mere expectancy or possibility of inheritance before the testator’s 
death). 
 90  David L. Skidmore & Laura E. Morris, Before the Party’s over the Arguments for and 
Against Pre-Death Will Contests, PROB. & PROP. 50., Mar.–Apr. 2013, at 51, 55. 
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2. Inconsistencies with the Legal Effect of a Will 
The underlying principles of ante-mortem probate are fundamentally 
inconsistent with the legal nature of a will.91  Like many jurisdictions, New 
Jersey has historically recognized the effect of a will to be inoperative until 
the testator’s death.92  This principle serves the practical purpose of allowing 
testators to freely plan their dispositions without the interference of lifetime 
challenges.93  Alternatively, an ante-mortem probate system accelerates will 
contests into proceedings that occur before the testator has died.94  By 
allowing interested parties to challenge a will during the testator’s lifetime, 
courts would essentially be acknowledging the will as an effective 
instrument, despite decades of precedent to the contrary.95 
B. Practical Considerations 
The legal considerations of ante-mortem probate are only further 
supplemented by an extensive range of practical difficulties arising from the 
nature of pre-death will validation.  While each ante-mortem jurisdiction 
offers measures to counteract some of these difficulties, no state has yet 
availed itself of them entirely. 
1. Family Disharmony 
For the ante-mortem states that have adopted variations of the Contest 
Model, a significant drawback lies in the proceeding’s sacrifice of 
confidential testamentary disposition during the testator’s lifetime.96  This 
fact, scholars argue, has the potential to disrupt family harmony, straining 
the relationship between the testator and presumptive takers who come to 
discover that their inheritance is unfavorable.97 
Professor Fink, founder of the Contest Model, agreed with this 
sentiment in his proposal, but ultimately questioned whether such 
disharmony was any more apparent than in a post-mortem contest.98  While 
 
 91  Id. at 52. 
 92  See Salvemini v. Giblin, 130 A.2d 842, 843 (N.J. 1957) (holding a will cannot operate 
in a testator’s lifetime); Miller v. Reich, 34 A.2d 143, 145 (N.J. Ch. 1943) (“A will, however, 
becomes effective as of the time of the death of the testatrix, and its operative effect is 
regulated by the law existing at that time.”); In re Will of Reilly, 493 A.2d 32, 35 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1985) (“[A] will ordinarily is ambulatory and speaks only as of the death of the 
testator.”). 
 93  Id. 
 94  See generally infra Part II.A. 
 95  Skidmore & Morris, supra note 90, at 51 (citing In re Veazey’s Will, 85 A. 176, 177–
78 (N.J. 1912)). 
 96  Gerry W. Beyer, Ante-Mortem Probate—The Definitive Will Contest Prevention 
Technique, 23 ACTEC Notes 83, 88 (1997), http://perma.cc/QP49-LETR. 
 97  Langbein, supra note 4, at 73. 
 98  Fink, supra note 19, at 289. 
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plausible, Fink too broadly generalizes the unique implications of family 
disharmony in the ante-mortem setting.  While family disharmony can arise 
before or after the testator’s death, its occurrence during the testator’s 
lifetime is particularly detrimental.  In death, the testator can avoid any 
anguish of familial tension caused by his or her bequests.  Alternatively, 
ante-mortem probate forces such tribulations into the testator’s lifetime.  The 
testator must not only endure the disharmony that would have arisen among 
heirs in the post-mortem context, but is additionally exposed to the direct 
resentment of interested parties.  Thus, states must be wary not to generalize 
conceptions of family disharmony in the ante-mortem setting, and instead 
should consider how best to mitigate these unique implications. 
Alternatively, Susan Thatch opines that states prohibiting ante-mortem 
probate for reasons of family disharmony is “seemingly paternalistic” and 
denies testators the flexibility of a “valuable estate-planning tool.”99  One 
can see how this conclusion might be reached: such a prohibition dubiously 
presumes that testators are unable to bear any strain on familial relationships, 
and thus should be barred from ante-mortem probate entirely.  As opposed 
to Professor Fink’s broader view, Thatch’s claim is arguably narrow in that 
it overlooks the substantial implications of family disharmony in favor of 
ante-mortem probate’s benefits.  Although prohibiting ante-mortem probate 
solely for reasons of family disharmony indeed seems paternalistic, states 
should not necessarily disregard its effects altogether.  Instead, states should 
evaluate and mitigate the effects of family disharmony as equally as any 
obstacle.  Overlooking family disharmony and instead focusing only on the 
benefits of ante-mortem probate would be a disservice to testators and 
interested parties alike; familial tensions that could have been avoided by 
creative legislation are ignored as a result.  Thus, while family disharmony 
should not be dispositive in a state’s decision to adopt ante-mortem probate, 
its effects should be fairly considered to provide the most efficient model for 
both individuals and courts. 
2. Size of Estate at Death 
It is not unlikely that a testator could die with a minimal amount of 
property in his estate, or even nothing at all.100  If a testator dies with nothing 
to distribute, any proceedings initiated to validate the will during his lifetime 
are rendered unnecessary.101  “If the testator, will contestants, and the court 
invest resources on a lifetime will contest, and the testator subsequently fails 
to leave an estate worth fighting about, then public and private funds would 
 
 99  Thatch, supra note 15, at 354.  
 100  Skidmore & Morris, supra note 90, at 55. 
 101  Id. 
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be wasted.”102  Under the Contest Model, this dilemma is especially 
burdensome on presumptive takers, as they must bear the costs of any 
challenge.103 
3. Judicial Resources 
Perhaps the most common threat of pre-death will validation is the 
strain that it could place on judicial resources.104  Because testators reserve 
the right to revoke or amend any will validated through ante-mortem-
probate, there is no limitation on how often such a proceeding could be 
initiated.105  While Professor Langbein predicts that testators using ante-
mortem probate would rarely wish to revoke or modify their validated 
wills,106 it is hardly unforeseeable that even a modest number of testators 
could bring multiple proceedings that would not have occurred under a 
standard probate system.  While no overwhelming authority exists to 
emphasize the severity of such abuse, the fact that testators have the ability 
to bring multiple proceedings is nonetheless an unnecessary and avoidable 
risk. 
While repeated contests brought under multiple proceedings seem less 
likely to occur,107 the testator’s abuse of judicial resources (whether or not 
intentional) could nonetheless severely limit a court’s efficiency.  In this 
sense, Langbein’s suggestion that testators be obligated to initiate each 
proceeding with the assistance of counsel would help to limit excessive 
amendments or revocations with respect to a validated will.108  That said, 
there are certainly legitimate reasons as to why a testator might need to 
update his validated will on multiple occasions.  In such cases, Professor 
Fink suggests a statute allowing minor changes that would not affect a ruling 
of testamentary capacity or undue influence.109 
4. Notice 
Even if a testator is able to validate his will in a proceeding, the binding 
nature of any resulting judgment is only applicable to those parties who 
receive proper notice.110  In cases where interested parties receive defective 
 
 102  Id. 
 103  See Fellows, supra note 4, at 1073. 
 104  Thatch, supra note 15, at 346.  
 105  Id. 
 106  Langbein, supra note 4, at 81. 
 107  See Fink, supra note 19, at 290 (“[C]oncepts of collateral estoppel coupled with the 
grant of summary judgment would prevent repeated trials when no new facts were 
disclosed.”).  
 108  Langbein, supra note 4, at 78. 
 109  Fink, supra note 19, at 277. 
 110  See supra Part II.B. 
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notice, or none at all, the risk of a post-death will contest remains 
significant.111  Thus, under a model requiring notice, the effectiveness of a 
proceeding depends largely upon the testator’s ability to not only keep track 
of those individuals whom he wishes to devise property, but also any 
intestate successors whom he does not consider, especially where there has 
been a birth or death after the proceeding.112  Under New Jersey’s current 
probate system, a variety of beneficiaries not contemplated by the testator 
are protected by omitted child and anti-lapse statutes.113  In the case of ante-
mortem probate, however, these measures would not protect the testator 
from the claims of such unknown beneficiaries if they did not receive notice 
of the original proceeding. 
5. Testator Migration 
It is unclear whether the binding nature of a validity declaration would 
retain its effect if the testator relocated to a state that did not offer ante-
mortem probate.114  Comparable precedent exists, however, to resolve such 
a conflict.  For instance, New Jersey courts have held that where testators 
migrate from community property states to separate property states, “the law 
of the place of the domicile of the acquiring spouse at the time of the 
acquisition governs the determination of whether the acquired property is 
separate or community.”115  In a similar manner, a court could defer to the 
law of the testator’s domicile in cases of migration. 
6. Inference of Invalidity 
A final point on the legal concerns of ante-mortem probate include 
litigious threats that may present themselves if not carefully addressed 
during legislative consideration.  Where a state offers some process of will 
validation during the lifetime of a testator, and the testator fails to utilize 
such a process, potential challengers may be able to assert an inference of 
invalidity during the probate process.  While the burden of proof is always 
on the challenger of a duly executed will,116 a testator’s failure to validate his 
or her will when the process was available may serve as fodder for litigation.  
As discussed previously, states such as Delaware have avoided this pitfall by 
explicitly denying as evidence of invalidity that ante-mortem probate was 
 
 111  Skidmore & Morris, supra note 90, at 52; Press Release, N.Y.C. B. Ass’n, supra note 
104. 
 112  Skidmore & Morris, supra note 90; Press Release, N.Y.C. B. Ass’n, supra note 104. 
 113  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-16 (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-35 (2005). 
 114  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-16 (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-35 (2005). 
 115  In re Unanue, 710 A.2d 1036, 1039 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (citing United 
States v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 816 F.2d 487, 490–491 n.7 (9th Cir.1987)); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 259 (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
 116  See, e.g., In re Estate of Stockdale, 953 A.2d 454, 470 (2008). 
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not used.117 
IV. A WORKABLE MODEL FOR NEW JERSEY 
The State of New Jersey has yet to adopt a model of ante-mortem 
probate.  Rather, the State employs post-mortem probate which considers 
mental capacity and undue influence only after the testator’s death.118  If New 
Jersey is to join the minority states and pursue a course of legislation 
adopting ante-mortem probate, it should do so by incorporating the strongest 
aspects of other state laws while at the same time mitigating the effects of 
the implications outlined above. 
Susan Thatch’s comment offers valuable insight pertinent to New 
Jersey’s adoption of an ante-mortem scheme, but leaves the framework of a 
suitable model open to discussion.119  Combining Thatch’s considerations 
with the model frameworks presented by legal scholars, a wealth of 
information exists to begin proposal of a model specifically tailored to New 
Jersey. 
A. Petition 
New Jersey’s first major consideration in adopting ante-mortem 
probate should be the petition process through which a testator may initiate 
a proceeding.  To have standing to file a petition, current states require that 
the testator be domiciled in the state or, at the very least, own real property 
in the state.120  Like Delaware, New Jersey should permit only testators that 
are domiciled in the state to take advantage of pre-death will validation.121 
On one hand, the obvious drawback to this proposal is the fact that a 
testator owning real property in New Jersey, but residing in another ante-
mortem jurisdiction, could never fully validate his will without the 
requirement of an ancillary proceeding in New Jersey.  This would allow 
interested parties, otherwise bound by the determination of the domicile 
state, to challenge the disposition of the New Jersey real property.  On the 
other hand, the primary benefit of this proposal would serve to lessen an 
influx of ante-mortem proceedings brought by testators who do not reside in 
the state.  This could help to reduce any potential strain on judicial resources, 
allowing the court to focus on matters strictly relating to New Jersey, rather 
than attending to ancillary ante-mortem proceedings involving wills from 
other jurisdictions. 
 
 117  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1311(d) (West 2015). 
 118  See Thatch, supra note 15, at 347; N.J. CT. R. 4:80-1.  
 119  See generally Thatch, supra note 15.  
 120  See supra Part II.B. 
 121  Id. 
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While disallowed in some jurisdictions, a testator’s guardian, 
conservator, or attorney-in-fact should be permitted to commence the 
proceeding on behalf of a testator who is physically incapable of doing so 
himself.122 Where a guardian’s presence is required, it is likely that a 
testator’s mental and/or physical state may become the basis for capacity and 
undue influence challenges.  To protect against such challenges, and to 
ensure certainty in the testator’s dispositions, a guardian’s ability to initiate 
a proceeding on behalf of the testator is crucial. 
Finally, consistent with Alaska’s requirements, the petition should 
include signed statements by the petitioner affirming the contemporariness 
of the will, its compliance with execution formalities, and a general 
statement that the testator is familiar with its contents.123  Imposing such a 
thorough standard will help to reduce potential challenges of fraud, which 
can be brought by interested parties regardless of the binding nature of a pre-
death will validation.124 
B. Notice 
The next major element in initiating an ante-mortem probate 
proceeding is deciding upon whom, if at all, notice should be served.  In 
determining whether interested parties should receive notice, the Contest and 
Administrative models are in direct tension.125  All of the ante-mortem 
probate states offer variations of the Contest Model.126  As stated, the Contest 
Model requires interested parties to be named in the proceeding, during 
which the contents of the will are disclosed.127  This lack of confidentiality 
has been considered the model’s largest flaw, especially because of its 
potential to strain family relationships.128  Nonetheless, notice served under 
the Contest Model is the most preferable option in that it ensures finality in 
the proceeding.129 
Alternatively, some scholars have advocated the no-notice style of the 
Administrative Model as an ideal way to mitigate the concerns of public 
disclosure and confidentiality.130  This proposal, however, fails to address 
 
 122  This is not to be confused with a testator who lacks the capacity to create or amend a 
will, in which case a guardian could not utilize ante-mortem probate to validate the testator’s 
wishes.  See generally Casternovia v. Casternovia, 197 A.2d 406, 409–10 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1964).   
 123  ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.12.545 (West 2010). 
 124  Fellows, supra note 4, at 1082. 
 125  See supra Part II.A. 
 126  See supra Part II.B. 
 127  Fink, supra note 19, at 290. 
 128  Fellows, supra note 4, at 1073. 
 129  Beyer, supra note 96, at 83, 86. 
 130  Arango, supra note 13, at 808; Lord-Halvorson, supra note 4, at 544. 
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the increased risk that a lack of notice would contribute to an erroneous 
finding of validity.131  The Administrative Model “subverts the goal of 
improving fact-finding during living probate because it precludes interested 
parties who possess relevant information” from participating in the 
process.132  As a result, the risk of a court upholding an invalid will under 
this model is significantly higher.  Additionally, the no-notice approach has 
no better chance in deterring family disharmony; parties who are questioned 
by a guardian ad litem are likely to become indignant when a testator refuses 
to reveal the contents of his will.133  Thus, to promote finality and ensure that 
invalid wills are not upheld, New Jersey should require interested parties to 
be given notice of the proceeding. 
If notice is to be required, the inquiry then turns on who may be entitled 
to receive it.  Like New Hampshire, interested persons should include the 
petitioner’s spouse, heirs, devisees under the will, appointed executors, the 
director of any charitable trust that is a devisee, and any other persons whom 
the court would deem interested parties if the petitioner died on the date of 
filing.134  This broad definition of interested persons must exist for two 
reasons.  First, by requiring notice to as many interested parties as possible, 
the testator can ensure that the binding effect of a declaratory judgment will 
not be overridden by a forgotten challenger.  This will not only benefit the 
testator, but will add to the finality of a proceeding, thus sparing the court 
from having to hear another challenge even though it issued a valid ruling.  
Second, and for the same reasons the Administrative Model fails, a broad 
requirement of notice will better serve to uncover all the facts and 
circumstances necessary to the court’s decision. 
The final proposal for notice is arguably the most dramatic, and entails 
how parties may issue a challenge.  A majority of ante-mortem jurisdictions 
impose a “filing statute,” which requires the testator to petition the court and 
initiate the action whether or not there is an actual challenge.135  Delaware, 
on the other hand, provides for a “notice statute,” whereby interested parties 
are given a time sensitive notices and may bring challenges of their own 
volition.136  In making its determination, New Jersey should decide in favor 
of adopting a “notice statute” similar to Delaware’s.  By putting the onus on 
the challenger to come forward, the court is relieved of excessive or frivolous 
claims.  On the other hand, some practitioners believe that requiring 
interested parties to initiate the action, rather than respond to one, imposes 
 
 131  Fellows, supra note 4, at 1081. 
 132  Id. 
 133  Fellows, supra note 4, at 1077. 
 134  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 552:18(III) (West 2014). 
 135  See supra Part II.B.; Lehman, supra note 66. 
 136  See supra Part II.B.; Lehman, supra note 66. 
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too great a burden.137  Though a viable contention, placing the burden on 
challengers is more consistent with honoring freedom of disposition; 
testators can more easily control the disposition of their property without the 
impediment of weak or meritless claims.  Because a “notice statute” does not 
afford challengers with the same ease of access as a “filing statute,” 
challengers are forced to evaluate the strength of their claims and weigh the 
overall costs and benefits of bringing suit.  Thus, a “notice statute” would 
provide a filter of sorts against claims that would not otherwise be brought 
and for this reason should be incorporated in future ante-mortem probate 
statutes. 
C. Hearing 
With respect to the proceeding itself, there are several elements New 
Jersey should consider adopting from other states, and some that should be 
disregarded altogether.  As Professor Langbein’s Conservatorship Model 
suggests, an ante-mortem proceeding should be conducted without a jury.138  
Not only is the evidence in an ante-mortem proceeding readily available and 
better left to an experienced judge, but statistics also suggest that juries tend 
to favor the circumstances of challengers.139  This implication has strong 
potential to upset the balance of power between the testator and interested 
parties.140  Therefore, the fact-finding stage of the proceeding is better left to 
the impartiality of a judge, as Langbein suggests.141 
Like Nevada, New Jersey should also limit the scope of the proceeding 
to matters of validity and refrain from allowing courts to issue rulings on 
construction.142  Legal scholars have noted that while the availability of the 
testator may help to resolve construction related ambiguities, there is no 
certainty that a court may nonetheless overlook them and issue a valid 
judgment.143  Next, and more importantly, the efficiency of the proceeding 
risks being undercut by a lengthy and complicated resolution of ambiguities 
that “may never be relevant or important.”144  As such, the power to issue a 
binding ruling on matters of construction seems too comprehensive a 
measure, and should be avoided to prevent additional points of conflict. 
 
 
 137  See e.g., Langbein, supra note 4, at 75. 
 138  Id. at 80–81. 
 139  See Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests—An Empirical Study, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. 
& TR. J. 607 (1987). 
 140  See id. 
 141  Langbein, supra note 4, at 81. 
 142  NEV. REV. STAT. § 30.040(2) (West 2009). 
 143  Fellows, supra note 4, at 1069. 
 144  Id. 
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Another important factor not explicitly recognized by all ante-mortem 
jurisdictions is the effect that a proceeding could have on a spousal elective 
share.  Like Delaware, New Jersey should clearly express that a spouse’s 
right to an elective share is not influenced by a pre-death declaration of 
validity.145  Under certain conditions, a spouse may bring a claim in New 
Jersey for one-third of a deceased spouse’s estate, regardless of whether the 
surviving spouse received an inheritance under the will.146  While the 
function of ante-mortem probate is to assess and honor a testator’s wishes, 
such wishes are irrelevant for purposes of determining the spousal right to 
an elective share.  As such, the superiority of the elective share should be 
expressly reaffirmed in any adoption of ante-mortem probate legislation. 
New Jersey must also be cognizant of challengers attempting to argue 
an inference of invalidity in cases where a testator failed to institute an ante-
mortem proceeding.  A strict prohibition like the ones imposed by Ohio, 
Delaware, and New Hampshire should be utilized as a preventative 
measure.147 
D. Revocation and Modification 
Once a court has determined the will’s validity, it should be sealed and 
stored in the offices of the probate court.  As explained earlier, states differ 
as to how a will may be revoked or modified once the proceeding has 
concluded.148  In deciding its approach, New Jersey should take the middle 
ground between North Dakota’s requirement that another proceeding be 
instituted, and other states which allow the will to be revoked or modified at 
the testator’s discretion.149  That is, a testator should be required to revoke or 
amend the will by submitting a notice to the court.150  If the testator’s ability 
to do so is impaired by illness, immobility, or substantial inconvenience, 
flexibility should be afforded to allow a representative or guardian to act on 
the testator’s behalf. 
Requiring notice to the court not only lessens the types of modification 
restraints imposed by North Dakota, but also eliminates the possibility of 
“unfounded or erroneous allegations that the . . . will has been revoked[,] 
without imposing another costly and time consuming procedure . . . .”151  
That said, this requirement could not be absolute.  Should the testator 
 
 145  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1311(f) (West 2015).  Although Delaware is the only 
jurisdiction to expressly state that a spousal elective share is unaffected, there is no indication 
whatsoever that the result would be different in any of the other ante-mortem probate states. 
 146  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:8-1 (West 2006). 
 147  See supra Part II.B. 
 148  Id. 
 149  Id. 
 150  Alexander & Pearson, supra note 47, at 119. 
 151  Fellows, supra note 4, 1079–80. 
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perform an otherwise valid revocation in his or her lifetime without 
submitting notice, it would be contrary to widely accepted principles to bar 
revocation on the basis that notice to the court was not submitted.  
Accordingly, a rebuttable presumption must exist to uphold the notice 
requirement without excluding principles of modification and revocation.  
Thus, absent notice to the court, a will validated through ante-mortem 
probate should be presumed not revoked, unless rebutted with clear and 
convincing evidence that the testator performed a valid revocation in 
accordance with established state law and/or the Uniform Probate Code. 
Because any revocations or modifications are made subsequent to a 
proceeding, they are generally not entitled to the binding effect of an ante-
mortem judgment.  In his proposal of the Contest Model, Professor Fink 
noted the potential for excessive proceedings instituted by the testator to 
retain the binding effect of validity for minor changes.152  Fink addressed this 
issue by suggesting that states create a statute allowing certain minor changes 
to be made, without losing the binding effect of validity.153  This could be 
another useful way to reduce the burden on judicial resources.  Such changes 
could include changing an executor, adding contingent beneficiaries, or 
updating the contact information of certain parties. 
Finally, to avoid negating the binding effect of a judgment in its 
entirety, New Jersey should also consider adopting the language of New 
Hampshire’s testator-friendly provision.154  That is, a previously validated 
will should remain binding to the extent it has not been modified or revoked 
by the testator.155  Such a provision would salvage the binding effect as to 
portions of the will unchanged by the testator, thus allowing the testator to 
more freely dispose of his property without the fear of wholly forfeiting the 
binding effect of a judgment. 
E. Legal Fees 
New Jersey is unique in its approach to legal fees with respect to 
challenges issued in a probate matter.  Where probate is granted and a 
contestant has reasonable cause for contesting the validity of a will, the court 
may direct the contestant’s attorney fees to be paid out of the estate.156 This 
requirement is in direct contention with the Contest Model’s imposition of 
costs on presumptive takers, though it bears strong resemblance to the cost 
 
 152  Fink, supra note 19, at 277. 
 153  Id. 
 154  See supra Part II.B. 
 155  Id. 
 156  N.J. CT. R. 4:42–9; 7A N.J. PRACTICE, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION § 1548 (rev. 3d 
ed. year). 
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shifting directive of the Conservatorship Model.157 
While New Jersey might be tempted to lean towards the same cost 
shifting requirement for ante-mortem proceedings, doing so would provide 
too great an advantage to contestants.  This policy would force testators into 
an inherently unfair dilemma; either initiate a proceeding and pay the costs 
of any reasonable challenges, or refrain from utilizing ante-mortem probate 
altogether.  Unlike a post-mortem proceeding where only a beneficiary’s 
interest may be reduced, the testator in an ante-mortem proceeding is still 
very much alive and will be directly impacted by an assessment of contestant 
fees.  This is an obvious conflict for both policy reasons and standards of 
general fairness.  As such, New Jersey should strongly consider altering its 
contestant fee rule to account for these unique circumstances, should ante-
mortem probate be adopted. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Even the most carefully drawn will may invariably face retaliation from 
parties who feel they have been disfavored.  Though individuals have many 
tools at their disposal to mitigate post-mortem contests, a testator’s ability to 
face these challenges in person is unparalleled.  Not only does ante-mortem 
probate allow the best evidence (the testator’s own testimony of his wishes) 
to come forward, but it also reinforces the value society places on the 
freedom of disposition.  While nationwide codification is arguably still in its 
infancy, the current minority states offer enough of a resource for New Jersey 
to evaluate the positives and negatives of ante-mortem probate and make an 
informed decision based on the considerations that have been set forth.  
While there are “no dead giveaways” with respect to a perfect model, the 
benefits of ante-mortem probate are undeniable and therefore should be 
readily placed at a testator’s disposal. 
 
 
 157  See supra Part II.A.2. 
